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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990s constitute a watershed decade for change in postcolonial Africa as one-party states have crumbled and old authoritarian leaders have 
stepped down or been removed. Th e ﬁ rst few years of the 1990s saw about half 
of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa either install, or prepare for, multiparty 
rule (Widner 1994:1; van de Walle 1999a:21). Of course, not all change has been 
positive and it is not clear whether the current democratic wave can be sustained 
as the latter part of the decade has brought both severe setbacks and continued 
success (Bratton and van de Walle 1997:3; Diamond 1999:269–270; Baker 2000:
9). Considering the precarious nature of African democratization, it is necessary 
to further investigate its future prospects.
Th e purpose of this article is to examine whether a Modern World-Systems 
(MWS) perspective can provide an improved understanding of the processes 
of democratization in Africa (and other developing regions of the world). Can 
a MWS approach help explain processes of democratization within states, and 
can this perspective complement, improve, or replace dominant (modernization) 
theories of democratization? Th is question will be answered by ﬁ rst developing 
a MWS explanation of democratization in the non-core, secondly by tracing the 
incorporation into the MWS of South Africa and Zambia and each country’s 
subsequent economic development and location in the international division of 
labor, thirdly by examining the transitions to democracy in each country, and 
fourthly by assessing the divergent processes of democratic consolidation in each 
country as they relate to location in the MWS.Th is article examines whether a Modern World-
Systems (MWS) perspective can provide an 
improved understanding of the processes of 
democratization in Africa (and other devel-
oping regions of the world) by conducting a 
comparative case study of South Africa and 
Zambia in the 1990s, examining the transitions 
to democracy and divergent processes of dem-
ocratic consolidation in each country. Semi-
peripheral South Africa has, due to its more 
advantageous position in the world-system, 
been better equipped than peripheral Zambia 
to safeguard democracy against erosion and 
reversal. Th e central irony of the MWS is that 
the weakest states in the MWS can be pushed 
around by core powers and are more easily 
forced to democratize while at the same time 
they are least likely to possess the resources 
necessary for democratic consolidation. Semi-
peripheral states can maintain their indepen-
dence vis-à-vis the core to a higher degree, but 
if the decision is made to undertake a demo-
cratic transition they are more likely to possess 
the resources necessary for successful consol-
idation. Th e MWS perspective allows for an 
improved understanding of the causal pathway 
of how position in the MWS translates into 
the ability to consolidate democracy than does 
approaches that emphasize domestic factors. 
abstract
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Th e era of globalization makes it diﬃ  cult to separate the internal and exter-
nal processes that shape democratization. Th omas Koelble (1998) argues that 
democratization is an integral component of the Western-led phenomenon of 
globalization of economics, politics, and culture. To suﬃ  ciently comprehend the 
changes taking place both globally and within countries entails situating them in 
the context of the integrated and interdependent capitalist world-economy that 
constitutes a fundamental component of the MWS (Wallerstein 1974a; Chase-
Dunn 1981). Th e wave of liberalization and democratization that has swept 
across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s ought therefore be properly understood 
within the context of the MWS.
Th e empirical components of democratization—a liberalization of politics 
and the exercise of multiparty elections (often accompanied by economic 
restructuring)—are not merely internal aﬀ airs with a genesis in societal pressures 
and developments within the nation-states themselves. Instead, these events are 
shaped and take place as a result of dynamics within the MWS that are gen-
erated through economic and political interactions between core, semi-periph-
eral, and peripheral zones of the system (Wallerstein 1974a; Chase-Dunn and 
Rubinson 1977). Democratization, thus contextualized, is often undertaken as 
the result of pressures from core countries of the West, including core orga-
nizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, 
and is consequently subject to the approval and consent of these countries with 
their own economic, political and ideological interest in these events taking place 
(Sandbrook 1993; Grosh 1994; World Bank 1994; Young 1994). While these 
events could be examined by the use of dyadic interactions, the MWS perspec-
tive adds a levels of analysis dimension to our understanding of democratization 
and consolidation somewhat similar to Peter Gourevitch’s (1978) “second image 
reversed” argument.
Peripheral countries often have little recourse but to conform to the wishes of 
core interests when it comes to undertaking economic liberalization and democ-
ratization (Sandbrook 1993; Widner 1994; Mkandawire 1999; Bond 2000). Few 
resources are available to non-core countries that will let them stake out their 
own course independent of the core. As history has shown, it becomes costly 
to insist on national sovereignty and self-reliance in matters of policy and, like 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, reject the neo-liberal policies championed by core 
countries (in the form of political liberalization and acceptance of IMF-led struc-
tural adjustment).1 Th e few countries still rejecting the core vision of a liber-
alized and democratic world, such as Myanmar, North Korea, and to a lesser 
degree Cuba, pay heavily for their “independence.”
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
A. Modernization and Democratization
Th e conceptualization of democracy used in this article is Robert Dahl’s 
(1971:2–3) polyarchy, which takes into consideration three necessary dimensions 
of democracy; (political) opposition, (public) participation, and (law-based) civil 
liberty.2 Democratic consolidation, which presumes that an initial transition to 
democracy (however incomplete or unstable it may be) has taken place, is mea-
sured by the degree to which a society that has embarked upon a transition to 
democracy is able to maintain democratic rule and practices after the initial tran-
sition. Th is article uses Andreas Schedler’s (1998:91) deﬁ nition of democratic 
consolidation as 
making democracies secure…extending their life expectancy beyond the 
short term…of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian 
regression…building dams against eventual “reverse waves,” 
thus restricting the concept of consolidation to its two negative notions: avoid-
ing democratic breakdown and erosion.3
Consolidation of democracy is of utmost importance in any new (and frag-
ile) democracy. In Africa, a continent with a poor democratic record and where 
economic crisis and societal strife often exacerbate threats to democratic survival, 
it becomes especially important to understand the processes of democratic con-
solidation and keeping a vigilant watch for the signs of democratic erosion that 
Schedler (1998) warns of.
Much of the literature on development, democratic transitions and sub-
sequent consolidation emphasizes endogenous factors within the state (Lipset 
1959; Lerner 1968; Huntington 1984; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Vanhanen 1997). 
Barrington Moore’s (1966) seminal work on comparative regime transitions 
1.  Th e Tanzanian economy was in dire straits and dependent on foreign aid from the mid-
1970s onward. Economic conditions deteriorated further in the 1980s and ﬁ nally, in 1986 Tanzania 
had to accept the IMF conditions that Nyerere had resisted since 1979 (Tordoﬀ  1997:234).
2. Dahl’s (1971) deﬁ nition of democracy moves beyond Josef Schumpeter (1947) and Samuel 
Huntington’s (1989 and 1991) minimalist notions of electoral democracy that are mainly concerned 
with the existence of competitive elections.
3.  Echoing Adam Przeworski et. al. (1996), Robert Mattes and Hermann Th iel (1998 and 
95–96) argue that “consolidation has to do with the probability of sustaining democracy,” and that 
any analysis of consolidation ought to take into account key structural correlates of democratic 
endurance such as national wealth, economic growth, economic equality, parliamentary govern-
ment, and favorable international and regional contexts.
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stresses internal state characteristics and dynamics as the determinants of such 
transitions. Various incarnations of modernization theory have been prevalent in 
“mainstream” research accounts of the prospects for democracy in the developing 
world.
Seymour Lipset (1959) linked higher levels of prosperity with increased 
chances for democratic government. Less desperately poor people and more 
resources available for redistribution tends to defuse the dangerous zero-sum 
nature of politics that is often a major impediment to democratization and con-
solidation. From this perspective, development is long term, linear, and irrevers-
ible. It leads to a convergence on the Western democratic and liberal political 
model (Deutsch 1964; Inkeles 1964; Rostow 1964). “[E]conomic development, 
cultural change, and political change are linked in coherent and even, to some 
extent, predictable patterns (Inglehart 1997:10), and modernization theory ﬁ nds 
support in many studies (Huntington 1991; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; 
Muller 1985; Muller 1995a and 1995b). Adding some nuance to this understand-
ing of the relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy, 
Gissinger and Gleditsch (1999:332) note evidence suggesting that income is a 
signiﬁ cant factor driving democratization at all levels (see Londregan and Poole 
1996:1) instead of democracy simply being a fortunate “side eﬀ ect” of economic 
growth.
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) clearly identify endoge-
nous forces as being primary in their conceptualization and subsequent quanti-
tative exploration of democratic transitions. Th eir “politico-structural” approach 
emphasizes domestic political factors while at the same time giving secondary 
attention to structural and contingent factors (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997:20).For Bratton and van de Walle (1997) a democratic transition is the 
result of key actors’ (e.g., economic, political, and societal) abilities to arrive at 
negotiated agreements where each party gets at least some of what it wants. 
Inﬂ uencing their emphasis on internal factors is their understanding that a 
rational choice perspective is best suited to explain political developments, an 
approach that is prevalent in the conventional democratization literature (e.g., 
Widner 1994). Bratton and van de Walle (1997:33) state that 
international factors…cannot on their own account for regime change, let 
alone for the installation and consolidation of democracy. Instead…political 
transitions [are] most directly affected by domestic factors.
Fortunately MWS theory makes possible the situating of these domestic fac-
tors within the global context from which they derive, thus establishing an 
explicit causal path between the international and domestic factors affecting 
democratization.4
B. The Modern World-System and Democratization
Th e present MWS with capitalism as its mode of production and with a 
hierarchical international division of labor emerged out of the remnants of feu-
dalism during the “long sixteenth century” in Europe and encompasses the entire 
world today (Wallerstein 1974b:406–407). Its two basic agents are the for-proﬁ t 
ﬁ rm and the sovereign territorial state (STS). Central to the MWS perspective 
is the idea that the social structure of individual societies has to be understood 
within the context of the entire world-system (Chase-Dunn 1981; Hopkins et. 
al. 1982). Consequently, changes in the larger MWS itself have signiﬁ cant conse-
quences for the internal structures of areas incorporated within it (Chase-Dunn 
and Rubinson 1977:454).5
Th e MWS is divided geographically into three zones of labor and export 
activity within the international division of labor—the core, semi-periphery, 
and periphery. Th ese divisions correspond to diﬀ erential development of state 
strength and economic characteristics of individual societies within the system 
(Chase-Dunn and Rubinson 1977).6 Th ere is not, however, a separate logic for 
4.  Th e Dependency approach (to development) of André Gunder Frank (1967) emphasizes 
the dependency of peripheral states on core states. Guillermo O’Donnell (1979) criticizes modern-
ization theory and highlights the inﬂ uence of a peripheral state’s dependency on core state’s econo-
mies to endogenous state actions and class-based politics. Daniel Chirot (1977) argues that core 
countries aﬀ ect peripheral economies (and their prospects of establishing democracy) in a nega-
tive way. Various other studies have emphasized the importance of exogenous factors in shaping 
the process of development, democratic transition and consolidation within states (Decalo 1992; 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992; Koelble 1998; McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a 
and 1998b). Th eda Skocpol (1973) argues for the importance of an intersocietal perspective bridg-
ing the gap between endogenous and exogenous theories of regime transitions by integrating 
Moore’s (1966) domestic class analysis with the central ideas of Dependency and Modern World-
Systems theories.
 5.  “A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, 
rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conﬂ icting forces which hold it 
together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It 
has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change 
in some respects and remain stable in others. One can deﬁ ne its structures as being at diﬀ erent 
times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning” (Wallerstein 1974a:347).
 6. Inequalities in the world-system between core and periphery tend to be of a permanent 
character and are increasing. Walter Rodney (1972:22) notes that the asymmetrical relationship 
based on exploitation of the periphery by the core has resulted in development in the core and 
underdevelopment in the periphery (cf. Frank 1966). While absolute levels of wealth may increase 
system-wide, the relative diﬀ erence tends to be reproduced through a process of unequal exchange 
whereby surplus value produced in the periphery is accumulated in the core (Chase-Dunn and 
Rubinson 1977:460). Th e increasing gap between rich and poor nations that, according to MWS 
theory, is a result of polarization within the system is subject to some debate recently. 
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economic and political forces, world-capitalism and the interstate system, within 
the MWS. Th ere is only one logic of capital accumulation in which the economic 
and political components make up opposite (and complementary) sides of the 
same coin. Economic and political developments are considered to be insepara-
ble (Chase-Dunn 1981). Illustrating the relationship between economy and poli-
tics, Immanuel Wallerstein (1974a:16) notes that 
[i]n a capitalist world-economy, political energy is used to secure monopoly 
rights (or as near to it as can be achieved). The state becomes less the central 
economic enterprise than the means of assuring certain terms of trade in 
other economic transactions. 
Kiren Chaudhry (1993:247) notes that markets are conscious constructs, not the 
“natural” or “neutral” phenomena that some neoliberal market adherents would 
suggest. Neoliberal theories of economic development often tend to ignore 
international (economic) developments that seriously impact the ability of 
developing countries to control and sustain their economies (Chaudhry 
1993:247–248). This interplay between politics and economics is imperative to 
understand how core developments in the MWS can impact not only the econ-
omies, but also political processes, of non-core states.
Th e MWS approach yields a diﬀ erent understanding of the link between 
development and democracy than does modernization theory. Instead of assum-
ing a linear process of development and democratization, MWS theory is better 
suited for explaining how countries embarking on a process of democratization 
often end up in the quasi-democratic limbo that Richard Joseph (1997) and 
Crawford Young (1999) call a “halfway house.” Th is is a frequent result for 
semi-peripheral countries such as South Africa (cf. Joseph 1999 on “virtual 
democracy”). Both modernization and dependency approaches to development 
understand an intermediary (or semi-peripheral) position in the world econ-
omy as temporary. For modernization theorists this intermediary position is 
a transitional phase in a country’s path from backwardness to modernity. For 
dependency theorists the intermediary position is a residual one. Countries will 
eventually be pulled into the core or (more often) the periphery due to the polar-
izing tendencies of development and underdevelopment in the world economy 
(Arrighi and Drangel 1986:10). 
Christopher Chase-Dunn (1975) ﬁ nds support for a dependency perspec-
tive rather than neoclassical and modernization theories in explaining uneven 
development in the world economy. Chase-Dunn’s argument contrasts with that 
of modernization theory, which tends to assume that increasing foreign (capital) 
penetration in non-core countries will lead to increased resources, i.e., capital and 
technology, available for societal development (Chase-Dunn 1975:725). Keeping 
in mind Lipset’s (1959) link between economic development and democracy, 
development along modernization theory assumptions should also increase the 
likelihood of democratic governance in non-core countries penetrated by foreign 
capital. Clearly the long history of coexistence of proﬁ table foreign corporations 
and non-democratic governance in Africa and elsewhere in the non-core contra-
dicts this basic modernization assumption. Th e notion that “foreign capital must 
be seen as a form of control as well as a ﬂ ow of resources” (Chase-Dunn 1975:735) 
is still highly relevant and often marginalized by current neoliberal thinking on 
the role of international ﬁ nancial institutions (IFI’s) and international capital 
in processes of economic development (and democratization) in non-core coun-
tries.7
Ironically, most African countries adopting neoliberal prescriptions for 
enhancing economic growth today might experience signiﬁ cant reductions in 
living standards in the short term. Th us support for democracy risks being 
undermined before there is any economic growth to sustain democracy as 
expected by modernization theory (Baker 2000:14). Clearly a MWS approach is 
well suited for explaining this kind of perpetuation of underdevelopment in the 
non-core.
1. The Role of the Core in Promoting Democratization
It is generally assumed that the recent “wave” of democratization in the 
Global South during the 1990s has beneﬁ ted from Western core countries push-
While a 1999 report by the United Nations Development Programme shows that the ratio of 
the income between the quintile of the world’s population living in the richest countries and the 
quintile in the poorest countries has increased from 30:1 in 1960 to 60:1 in 1990 and 72:1 in 1997, a 
recent study by the Norwegian Institute of International Aﬀ airs (Melchior et. al. 2000, 2–3) argues 
that when global income inequalities are adjusted for purchasing power they have for the most part 
decreased since the 1960s.
7.  Lipset (1959) and Lerner (1968) initiated the development paradigm connecting democra-
tization to economic growth and modernization. Frank (1967), Wallerstein (1984 and 1993) and 
others have emphasized global capitalism as a cause for underdevelopment and thus shifted the 
focus of democratization from internal to external factors. Dahl (1971), Diamond et. al. (1989–89) 
and others have connected democratization to various historical, social, structural, and cultural 
factors. 
Others emphasize domestic action taken by national actors, such as the strengthening of state 
capacity through liberalization of economic structures, maintenance of social and political order 
while not infringing upon basic rights and improving accountability and rule of law while at the 
same time controlling corruption. Democratic governance, e.g., strengthening political parties and 
their ties to society, invigorating civil society and ensuring the autonomy of legal and political insti-
tutions, is also integral to democratic consolidation (Diamond et. al. 1997:xviii).
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ing for democracy worldwide. From a MWS perspective one could, however, 
question whether it really is in the interest of core countries that semi-peripheral 
and peripheral countries democratize. Could exploitation of the non-core not be 
better facilitated by dealing with authoritarian rulers rather than democratically 
elected ones with some responsibilities towards their citizenry?
Th e argument that it is in the interest of the core to push for democracy in 
the non-core can be supported with reference to the literature on democratiza-
tion. Along with the push for democracy come demands for “good governance” 
(Hyden and Bratton 1992; World Bank 2000, Ch. 2). It is not necessarily clear 
that the “good governance” stemming from neoliberal political and economic 
reforms is as beneﬁ cial to people in non-core countries as it is for core investors. 
In fact, it might be argued that the “virtual democracy” that is often the result 
of democratizing eﬀ orts in the non-core mainly serves the interests of core 
countries and capital interests [e.g., the interests of multinational corporations 
(MNC’s) via the policy demands of IFI’s such as the IMF and World Bank]. Th e 
“virtual democracy” has a formal basis in citizen rule but key decision-making 
is insulated from popular involvement and oversight. Where popular participa-
tion is widened, policy choices and outcomes are narrowed. Political incum-
bents use violence and electoral fraud to manipulate the political transitions in 
order to relegitimize their power. External actors only encourage multiparty elec-
tions when such elections will not threaten vested domestic and foreign interests 
( Joseph 1997:367–368 and 1999b:60–63). 
It is in the post-Cold War era that core support for democracy becomes 
especially convenient for core economic interests. “Now that global capitalism 
has no economic rivals, the institutional certainties of democratic governments 
are usually preferred to the arbitrariness of autocratic rule.” Furthermore, 
while the core institutions and practices of contemporary democracy rest on 
the premise of a free play of ideas and interests, certain substantive policy 
outcomes are ruled out, and others are assured. Participation may be broad, 
but policy choices are narrow ( Joseph 1997:367). 
Thus it is “safer” for core powers and economic interests to demand democracy 
in the non-core today. The likelihood of democratizing countries implementing 
policies that radically deviate from the current version of the “Washington con-
sensus” is greatly reduced due to the economic and political leverage of core gov-
ernments and institutions.8 Countries in Africa that have moved in a demo-
cratic direction during the 1990s are often at the mercy of IFI’s and Western 
governments as these African nations require continued aid and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) to sustain development efforts essential to maintaining some 
societal stability and thus the possibility of democratic consolidation (Mair 
1996).
Empirical evidence supports the claim that the core is pushing democratiza-
tion in the non-core. While being careful when discussing political prescriptions, 
emphasizing that “African countries have to determine the political structures 
that suits them best,” the World Bank sees democratization (discussed in terms 
of “governance”) of African states as crucial for economic development. 
Democracy can have many faces, but some general principles must be shared 
by all: constitutional government, respect for human rights, adherence to 
the rule of law, and freedom of expression and association” (World Bank 
2000, 66). 
Kick et. al. (2000:137) note that “[t]he democratization agenda is fully sup-
ported by a range of [core dominated] supranational agencies with considerable 
persuasion and coercive potential (e.g., U.N., NATO, World Bank),” and van 
de Walle (1999b:97) emphasizes that (core) “international market forces” and 
“their privileged agents in Africa, the IMF and the World Bank” largely control 
the policy choices available to democratizing nations. Joseph (1997:368–369) 
attributes democratization in Africa during the 1990s to three factors: pro-
longed fiscal crisis, the increasing control of (African) economic policy-making 
by IFIs and Western bilateral agencies, and “the shift of western powers (espe-
cially the United States) after the end of the cold war from tolerance of and alli-
ance with authoritarian regimes to liberalization of their systems” (cf. Young 
1999:32). While several authors point to a significant variation in outcomes of 
the general democratization agenda (Peters 1995; Goma and Font 1996; Huber 
1996), they also note some common trends in the periphery (Clapham 1996; 
Schwartzman 1998). 
Most notable among these is that core economic and political-military pro-
grams to “democratize” the non-core gradually have reduced the number of 
authoritarian regimes the world over (Kick et. al. 2000:137).
8.  Th e “Washington consensus” represents the collection of developmental policies promoted 
by Western nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (the IMF and the World Bank). It has 
been reformulated during the latter half of the 1990s to take into consideration a broad array of 
actors, including the state, while strongly retaining an emphasis on the role of private actors and 
markets (Broad and Cavanagh 1999). Th e central prescription for development emanating from 
the World Bank (2000) is a call for continued emphasis on trade, diversiﬁ cation, and increasing 
competitiveness.
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Both the U.S. and the European Union (EU), the key political and economic 
actors in the core, have unequivocally been proclaiming their support for democ-
racy worldwide in the post-Cold War era. Th e United States Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) designates 35 African countries as eligible for trade 
beneﬁ ts—speciﬁ cally a “most liberal access to the U.S. market”—as of January 
2001. Th e AGOA requires countries to liberalize both their political and eco-
nomic systems to gain eligibility. Countries, like South Africa and Zambia, 
determined to have established, or…making continual progress toward 
establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and 
political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; 
protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to 
reduce poverty; increasing availability of health care and educational oppor-
tunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of 
certain child labor practices are eligible for AGOA benefits (AGOA 2001). 
Th e U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) explicitly states 
as one of its goals to: 
“promote principles of democratic governance and provide technical assis-
tance to newly formed democracies. USAID works to encourage democracy 
in developing nations throughout the world partly on the intrinsic values 
which rests in the ideals of liberty, personal and civic freedom, and govern-
ment of, for, and by the people…”
USAID also emphasizes that “[p]olitical and economic reforms must go hand 
in hand if either is to succeed” (USAID 2001). Across the Atlantic, the Euro-
pean Commission’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR) “illustrates the commitment of the European Union to assisting in 
the global effort to build and reinforce pluralist and democratic society, gov-
erned by the rule of law, and respecting human rights” (European Commission 
2000:5, 8–10).
Kick et. al. (2000) understand the push by core actors for democracy in the 
non-core not merely as an altruistic means to promote development, but also as a 
self-serving means to legitimizing existing inequalities in non-core countries that 
the core does business with. For example, conducting business that might gen-
erate good corporate proﬁ ts but results in little if any sustainable development 
in a country still marred by extreme income inequalities and widespread pov-
erty (e.g., South Africa) is less objectionable when its government has made a 
transition to democracy. Once a democratic transition has taken place, economic 
policy decisions can be referred to as the “will of the people” via their representa-
tives in government no matter what the actual results of these policies are for the 
general populace. 
Th is line of reasoning ﬁ ts well with the idea that the MWS, and thus the 
core whose interests the MWS mainly serves, depends on some degree of sta-
bility and maintenance of three zones of development where the periphery is 
most accessible for exploitation and the semi-periphery guarantees some stabil-
ity and protection against overwhelming polarization within the world-system 
(Wallerstein 1979:60–61; Arrighi and Drangel 1986:9–10). Th e core needs non-
core zones available for exploitation and such a state of aﬀ airs might be more 
easily maintained if the perpetuation of inequality and underdevelopment is 
obscured by some degree of democracy. With regard to overall core impact on 
democratization and other political developments in the non-core, Kathleen 
Schwartzman (1998:179) sees core actions as having “inescapable ramiﬁ cations 
for the economic and political regimes of non-core nations…[D]omestic polit-
ical structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of economic 
relations.” Her argument supports this article’s emphasis on the importance of 
situating processes of democratization in non-core nations in a global context.
2. Labor, Class, and State
Core areas are characterized by strong states and an economy that is based 
on capital-intensive, high-wage, high-technology production that tends to involve 
relatively low levels of labor exploitation and coercion. Th e periphery is charac-
terized by weak states and labor-intensive, low-wage, low-technology produc-
tion that tends to involve relatively high levels of labor exploitation and coercion, 
such as slavery in the 18th century. Th e semi-periphery contains both core-like 
and periphery-like economic activities and political structures (Wallerstein 1984, 
61; Shannon 1996:33). Importantly, the nature of a state’s economy will, to a 
high degree, determine the resources available in the pursuit of democratization 
(Diamond 1999:78).
Th e bourgeoisie is generally strong in core countries and weak in the periph-
ery where economic stagnation (and collapse) and colonization have prevented 
its growth and entrenchment. Barrington Moore (1966:418) asserts that “a vigor-
ous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element 
in the growth of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy.” Th e 
strong class of capitalists that can be a driving force of economic and democratic 
development has not developed in most African countries and other peripheral 
regions of the world (Sandbrook 1985 and 1993; Bates 1994:19–21).
State strength tends to vary with position in the MWS, with strong states in 
the core and weak to nonexistent ones (colonies) in the periphery (Wallerstein 
1974a:349). State strength is related to state capacity and should not be confused 
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with state size, its degree of centralization, or its ability to repress and control 
society when results are not optimal from the perspective of its ruler’s interest 




Th e basic unit of analysis in MWS theory is the world-system itself 
(Wallerstein 1974a). Th us the two cases selected for this study are states exist-
ing within this world-system, South Africa and Zambia. Th e time frame of the 
study is the last decade of democratic transition and consolidation in the two 
countries, roughly 1990 to the present. Th is controlled comparison case study 
is informed by John Stuart Mill’s “method of diﬀ erence,” where an investigator 
examines paired observations in two or more cases and determines whether 
diﬀ erent outcomes are congruent or incongruent with a theory’s predictions 
(Lijphart 1971 and 1975; van Evera 1997:23). 
Th e selection of South Africa and Zambia contrasts certain historical, politi-
cal, and socioeconomic characteristics. Th e two countries vary in one important 
aspect concerning the MWS perspective; South Africa is located in the semi-
periphery of the MWS and Zambia is near the bottom of the periphery. In terms 
of outcomes of the democratization processes (consolidation), it appears that 
South Africa has been able to strengthen its democracy while Zambia has expe-
rienced serious problems in terms of maintaining its ﬂ edgling democracy.
1. Locating Countries in the MWS
In order to make the argument about divergent trajectories in South Africa 
and Zambia, the position of each country in the global division of labor must 
be clearly established. Th is can be done by reference to the literature on the posi-
tion of countries in the MWS and by examining relevant diﬀ erences in national 
economic characteristics. Based on the existing literature and data on the South 
African and Zambian economies (see the empirical section) it is possible to 
make a distinction between positions of the two countries in the MWS. 
While there are some disagreements on exactly how to measure the semi-
periphery and which countries belong in it, a clear precedent exists for designat-
ing South Africa as semi-peripheral and Zambia as peripheral. David Snyder 
and Edward Kick’s (1979:1110) designation of South Africa as a core country 
together with the United States, Japan, West Germany and others is perhaps 
the least useful for this project. Snyder and Kick’s (1979) “block model” measures 
trade, interventions, diplomats and treaties in 1965. Th is model exaggerates the 
role of South Africa by focusing on its economic and geo-strategic role at per-
haps the height of Pretoria’s inﬂ uence regionally and is in any case of little use 
for understanding South Africa’s role in the global division of labor in the 1990s. 
Other measures are more instructive for the purposes of this article.
C. P. Terlouw’s (1993) measure of “mean coreness” based on economic, military 
and political factors gives South Africa one of the lowest “degrees of coreness” 
among countries he include as being semi-peripheral.9
 Others are more explicit about South Africa’s role in the semi-periphery. 
Giovanni Arrighi and Jessica Drangel (1986, 69) make a clear distinction between 
South Africa as an “organic member” of the semi-periphery and Zambia as an 
“organic member” of the periphery throughout the 1938-1970 period measured. 
Arrighi and Drangel (1986) utilize Gross National Product (GNP) per capita 
measures when locating countries in the global division of labor, as does this arti-
cle when highlighting economic diﬀ erences between South Africa and Zambia 
(see especially tables 1, 6, and 7). 
Patrick McGowan and Fred Ahwireng-Obeng (1998b) make a strong case 
for South Africa being a regional hegemon due to its role as the only semi-
peripheral economy in an otherwise peripheral region (including Zambia). Th ey 
argue that patterns of commodity trade are the best indicator of a country’s role 
in the global division of labor (1998b:173–177). Similarly, William Martin and 
Wallerstein (1990, 103) label South Africa a “stable member of the semi-periph-
ery” based on its economic relationships with the periphery and core. Following 
these authors, economic data on trade characteristics, speciﬁ cally data on export 
and import patterns in tables 2 and 4, are used in this article to locate South 
Africa in the semi-periphery and Zambia in the periphery.
B. Key Variables
Th e independent variable is the state’s location in the MWS that is determined 
by measuring its economic characteristics, speciﬁ cally the nature of its exports 
and imports. Particularly important to the causal connection between location in 
the MWS and democratic consolidation in individual countries is the degree of 
economic vulnerability, and thus susceptibility to external pressures for change, 
9.  Terlouw (1993:99) measures part in world trade, stability of trade relations, GDP per capita 
as part in world total GDP for the inhabitants of each state, military power, number of embassies 
sent and received by a state and number of diplomats sent and received by a state.
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Hypothesis 2: it is predicted that a peripheral state will not be able to exer-
cise independence and resist core pressures. Location in the periphery precludes 
the state from diﬀ using political and economic costs associated with democrati-
zation to other states; instead it has to deal with all the pressures of democrati-
zation and consolidation by itself, which it is particularly ill-equipped to do. A 
peripheral state will more easily be pressured into democratic transition but will 
be less likely, due to insuﬃ  cient resources, to consolidate its democracy once it is 
installed.
Figure 1 provides a conceptualization of the two hypotheses to be tested in 
this article. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. Incorporation into the Modern World-System
1. South Africa
European settler origins in what is today the Republic of South Africa began 
with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape as governor for the Dutch East 
India Company in 1652 (Chase 1967:5–6). Th e actual incorporation of South 
Africa into the periphery of the MWS began around 1800 in terms of produc-
tion processes with the Cape producing wool and Natal producing sugar for 
Great Britain (Chase 1967; Wallerstein 1986:139). 
Industrialization commenced at an increasingly rapid pace with the discov-
ery of diamonds in the Free State in 1871 and gold on the Witwatersrand in 
1886 (Stadler 1987:36–38). It is not clear that South Africa had become a semi-
peripheral country at the time of the Union of South Africa in 1910. However, 
the global depression of the 1930s, along with the subsequent manufacturing for 
the war eﬀ ort, provided the impetus for increased import-substitution indus-
trialization in South Africa and thus generated an indigenous industrialist and 
capitalist class (classically capital in South Africa had three factions: mining, 
industry, and farming) which ensured that South Africa emerged out of WW 
II as a thoroughly semi-peripheral nation (Stadler 1987:58–59; Martin and 
Wallerstein 1990:102–103).
that characterizes the state in core, semi-peripheral and peripheral regions of the 
MWS.10
Th e intervening variables are the state’s nature of class relations, civil society, 
and state strength that are derived from its location in the MWS. Th ese vari-
ables are of a “political” nature and thus distinct from the “economic” nature of 
the independent variable (location in the MWS). Th e nature of class relations 
and civil society will be described through examination of the events leading to 
democratic transition in each country and the role played by domestic and exter-
nal actors. State strength will be measured by examining the availability of politi-
cal and economic resources in each country to resist core pressures, and thus 
acquire some “ownership” of the democratization process, and to contain domes-
tic upheavals.
Th e dependent variable is degree of democratic consolidation that is ulti-
mately aﬀ ected by the state’s location in the MWS. Political and societal devel-
opments following the initial transitions to democracy will provide the basis 
for judging the degree to which each country’s government has been able to 
avoid relapse into non-democratic practices and instead consolidated its demo-
cratic achievements by holding successive free and fair multiparty elections and 
upholding political rights and civil liberties.
C. Causal Argument and Hypotheses
A set of predictions can be made based on the identiﬁ cation of variables. 
Th ese predictions constitute the two hypotheses to be tested in this article and 
are derived from the divergent trajectories of democratic consolidation expected 
to be found in states located in diﬀ erent zones of the MWS. Empirical inquiry 
will serve to conﬁ rm or refute these theory-driven hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: it is predicted that a semi-peripheral state will be able to exer-
cise a signiﬁ cant degree of independence by resisting core pressures and because 
semi-peripheral status enables it to diﬀ use some of the political and economic 
costs associated with democratization onto its peripheral neighbors. Compared 
to peripheral states, the semi-peripheral state will have more resources and a 
stronger civil society and state available to facilitate democratic consolidation 
once a transition to democracy takes place.
10.  Historical background variables held constant across cases-e.g., British colonial heritage, 
location in Africa, majority Bantu populations, ethno-linguistic fragmentation, high degrees of 
income inequality, and so on-cannot explain the outcomes of the dependent variable. Instead, it is 
variation on the independent variable (location in the MWS) that is predicted to explain variation 
on the dependent variable (democratic consolidation).
Figure 1 – Location in the MWS and its Impact on Democratic Consolidation
Semi-Periphery Periphery
Democratization Ability to resist No ability to resist
Consolidation Resources to succeed Insufficient resources to succeed
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South Africa became a major force in southern Africa after the Second 
World War… [T]he political structures which evolved in South Africa were 
complex and atypical of other colonial settlements in the region. Unlike ter-
ritories in other parts of Africa, where direct colonial rule persisted until 
after the Second World War, South Africa enjoyed effective political inde-
pendence from metropolitan powers from the beginning of the twentieth 
century. South Africa’s economy is largely controlled by domestic forces 
(Stadler 1987:10).
2. Zambia
Incorporation of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia since independence in 1964) 
began with the mining activities of the British South African Company through-
out its southern African territories in the early years of the 20th century. Northern 
Rhodesia attained British protectorate status in 1911, and at ﬁ rst the territory 
served as a mere labor reserve for Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and 
South Africa. During the 1920s copper mining was intensiﬁ ed in Northern 
Rhodesia’s “copper belt” and the territory became an important mining economy 
(Chiwele 1996, 211). Colonial policies apparently discouraged the development 
of agriculture and manufacturing which resulted in the very high dependence 
on revenues from copper exports at Zambian independence (Klepper 1979; 
Seidman 1979).
Typical of a peripheral economy the wealth generated by copper mining did 
not stay in the country. Th e Northern Rhodesian economy had recovered from 
the Great Depression by 1935 and the mines boasted a proﬁ t well above 4 mil-
lion British Pounds by 1937. Of these proﬁ ts Northern Rhodesia kept only about 
13–14 percent by way of taxation while the rest of the wealth went to Britain, 
the British South African Company and overseas shareholders. At the same time 
Northern Rhodesia’s African population (approximately 97 percent of the total 
population) had not one secondary school as the territory, according to colonial 
authorities, was too poor to aﬀ ord one (Davidson 1994, 50).
B. Economic performance since World War II
1. South Africa
After nearly two decades of sustained growth, the apartheid economy began 
to falter in the mid-1970s. Th e relative calm in South African society during 
the height of apartheid was replaced by wildcat strikes in the 1970s, the Soweto 
uprising of 1976, and other major riots in urban South Africa in 1980, 1984, and 
1985 (Stadler 1987:1). Th e rise of a black urban wage class in South Africa in the 
1970s was on one hand a result of the country’s need to remain competitive in 
a tighter world-economy. At the same time, this urban wage class became the 
source of militant trade unionism and the wave of strikes that emerged in the 
1970s and was in part the catalyst for the widespread urban political conﬂ ict 
of the 1980s (Martin and Wallerstein 1990:105). Robert Price (1991) notes that 
apartheid developed into a serious liability for South African economic perfor-
mance. By the time of the National Party (NP) victory in 1948, South African 
industry had become thoroughly reliant on cheap black labor, including forms 
of skilled labor required by the complexities of an industrial economy, and there 
would be no turning the tide (as was the intent of the apartheid “visionaries”) 
regarding this basic fact. 
Dependence on black labor made black townships a more or less perma-
nent feature in and around South Africa’s white cities. Attempts by the apart-
heid regime to discourage such permanence of blacks in “white South Africa” 
merely served to exacerbate the hardships of township life, which in the end 
would create a fertile ground for unrest and huge expenses for the apartheid 
regime when it ﬁ nally accepted the reality of blacks in South Africa and decided 
to upgrade township conditions. Black industrial labor meant black proletarian-
ization and collective organization, which ultimately would lead to demands for 
political inclusion (Price 1991). From this point on South African government 
policies were at constant odds with the country’s role in the international divi-
sion of labor.
Th e two decades following the 1973 oil crisis were, despite a few minor 
upswings, overwhelmingly negative in terms of South African economic perfor-
mance. An average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 6 percent in 
the 1960s declined to an average of 1.8 percent in the 1980s and eventually became 
negative (–1.1 percent) in the early 1990s. Th e South African economy of the 
1980s and early 1990s was characterized by a plunge in gross ﬁ xed investment, 
high rates of capital ﬂ ight, low rates of private savings leading to plant underuti-
lization and declining competitiveness, low levels of private savings, very high 
unemployment, and chronic balance of payments diﬃ  culties (Gelb 1991:6 and 
1994:3–4). 
[T]he crisis reflected the break-down of the post-war accumulation strat-
egy based on primary product exports and inward industrialization (includ-
ing import substitution), based on a violently regimented labour supply… It 
also imposed structural limits on the growth of domestic demand, inhibited 
productivity and led to a severe shortage of skilled labour (Marais 1998:
100–101).
2. Zambia
Despite some signiﬁ cant ﬂ uctuations in economic performance, Zambia 
remained peripheral during both its colonial and independence eras. Much like 
other African nations, Zambia inherited economic and political disadvantages, 
being “nearly devoid of indigenous owner-producers [a capitalist class] at inde-
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slowest progress in human development among countries starting with medium 
human development and Zambia making the slowest progress in human develop-
ment among countries starting with low human development.11
C. Current Location in the Modern World-System
A state’s location within the international division of labor can be deter-
mined by assessing the standard characteristics of a state’s economic activities as 
reﬂ ected in the nature of its exports and imports (Wallerstein 1974a and 1974b; 
McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a and 1998b). Th e economies of South 
Africa and Zambia diﬀ er on many key measures. As manifested by their his-
torical development and contemporary economic characteristics, South Africa 
has remained semi-peripheral and Zambia peripheral in the post-WW II era 
(Arrighi and Drangel 1986).
Table 2 illustrates the diﬀ erences in diversiﬁ cation of the South African and 
Zambian economies. While 49 percent of South African exports stem from pri-
mary products and natural resource-intensive manufactures (a testament to the 
periphery-like activities that exist in semi-peripheral states) the corresponding 
number for Zambia is 89 percent. South Africa’s economy contains a high pro-
portion of high-technology exports; technology- and human capital-intensive 
manufactures make up 44 percent of its exports while they only make up 3 
percent of Zambia’s exports. South Africa’ growth in technology and human 
resources-intensive manufactures (17 percent combined) is far higher than its 
negative growth in primary products and natural resource-intensive manufac-
tures (–12 percent combined) in the period 1994–1998. Conversely, Zambia’s 
pendence,” stemming from its previous existence as a British colony used as a 
means of enrichment for the metropole (Denemark 1991:538). While Zambia 
experienced a strong economic upswing during the ﬁ rst decade after indepen-
dence, an upswing propelled by copper exports that made up 90 percent of its 
export revenues (Esomba 1995, 95), the colonial legacy combined with govern-
mental mismanagement perpetuated the weakness of the Zambian state and the 
high vulnerability of its economy (Hamalengwa 1992; Ihonvbere 1996).
Nationalization of the Zambian mines in the late 1960s, coupled with mis-
management and corruption of the state mining company, eventually led to 
declining productivity and proﬁ ts (Bratton 1994:105). As a result of declining 
copper prices, deteriorating terms of trade, disinvestments in key sectors and 
drought, Zambia’s “GDP growth declined from 3.7 percent per annum in the 
early 1970s to an average of only 1.0 percent in the 1974–1990 period” (South 
African Department of Finance 1998). 
While diversification of export earnings away from copper, and the promo-
tion of the agricultural sector which absorbed the bulk of employment, had 
both been primary stated government objectives since independence…gov-
ernment investment and pricing strategies had done little to bring them 
about. Agricultural growth lagged behind the rest of the economy…and 
agricultural exports were negligible despite considerable potential ( Jones 
1994:26).
The inherent danger of Zambia’s dependency on copper exports became evi-
dent as the commodity price crisis emerged during the 1980s.
Zambia’s main economic strength became a costly liability in an increas-
ingly interdependent global economy leading to a series of four standby agree-
ments with the IMF between 1971 and 1981, loans from the World Bank between 
1973 and 1976, and a belated eﬀ ort at reforming the national economy beginning 
in 1985 (Bratton 1994:104–107). As Zambia became beset by foreign debt and 
decreasing revenues, IMF loans became increasingly conditional. Zambia would 
have to liberalize and adjust in order to receive more help (Esomba 1995:96). In 
1999 Zambia spent 13.9 percent of GDP on debt servicing, up from 6.2 percent 
in 1990. By contrast South Africa spent nothing on debt servicing in 1990 and 3.7 
percent of GDP in 1999 (UNDP 2001:196–197). Th ese developments are illus-
trative of how weak peripheral countries, dependent on core (economic) actors 
such as the IMF, are less resistant to external pressures for liberalization and 
democratization and thus less “in charge” of their own policies.
Table 1 illustrates persistent economic problems in both South Africa and 
Zambia. Both countries have experienced an overall decline in per capita GDP in 
the last twenty-ﬁ ve years. Th is is consistent with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 1999) labeling South Africa as one of the countries making 
Table 1 – GDP Per Capita, 1975–1998*
1975 1980 1985 1990 1998
Average Annual  
Change (%)
1975–98
South Africa 4,574 4,620 4,229 4,113 3,918 –0.7
Zambia 641 551 483 450 388 –2.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 699 692 629 614 578
High Income Countries 17,673 20,192 22,082 25,284 28,400
World 4,006 4,430 4,575 4,970 5,331
* 1995 US$
Source: United Nations Development Programme (2000:178–181)
11.  It should be noted that the overall decline, or slow progress, of overall Human Development 
Index (HDI) values and rankings of sub-Saharan African states is in large part related to the cur-
rent AIDS epidemic that is reducing life expectancy considerably across the continent.
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growth in technology and human capital-intensive manufactures (19 percent 
combined) is less than its growth in primary products and natural resource-
intensive manufactures (32 percent combined) over the same time period. South 
Africa’s economy displays growth in “core-like” sectors while Zambia’s economy 
displays growth in “periphery-like” sectors. 
Table 3 illustrates Zambia’s dependence on a primary export commodity—
copper—that is characteristic of many peripheral economies (they are usually 
“monocrop” and “monomineral”). Zambia clearly displays the economic charac-
teristics of a peripheral state. As a country no more industrialized than most 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries (with the excep-
tion of South Africa), “[c]opper and cobalt form the mainstay of Zambia’s export 
goods” (South African Department of Finance 1998).12
While South Africa also is dependent on mineral exports, its dependency on 
such exports is less serious and its economy is clearly more diversiﬁ ed (as beﬁ ts 
a semi-peripheral country) than the Zambian economy. According to the South 
African Department of Finance (1998), 
South Africa has a modern, well-diversified economy in which agriculture, 
mining, secondary industry (manufacturing, electricity, gas, water and con-
struction), commerce and a broad structure of service establishments con-
tribute to the wealth of the nation. 
It is especially over the past decade that the South African economy has diversi-
fied. Growth in communications, transport, financial services, tourism and 
manufacturing sectors has eclipsed the former importance of the mining, quar-
rying, and agricultural sectors. The biggest growth has taken place in the 
finance and insurance sector that has grown from 14.8 percent of GDP in 1991 
to 20.2 percent in 2000, making it the largest sector of the South African econ-
omy. Notably, the agriculture, mining, and quarrying sectors, traditional main-
stays of the South African economy, now account for less than 10 percent of the 
country’s GDP for the first time in history (The Sunday Independent 2001). 
Although South Africa is still dependent on exports of primary and intermedi-
ate commodities to core countries, the country’s exports to the rest of Africa 
consist mainly of manufactured goods (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a 
and 1998b) in accordance with its semi-peripheral role in the world-economy.
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Table 3 – Dependency on Commodity Exports, 1994
Country Major Commodities
Value of exports in
$US (millions), 1994
Share of commodities
in total exports (%)
South Africa gold, minerals 25,300 60
Zambia copper, cobalt 1,075 84
Sources: Kotelo (1995:10) and Africa Institute (1995:73–74)
12.  Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
are members of the SADC.
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Th ere are discernible diﬀ erences in import patterns between South Africa 
and Zambia as well. Table 4 lists the ﬁ ve major product groups imported to 
South Africa and Zambia according to value in 1995. According to the South 
African Department of Finance (1998), imports to South Africa consists mainly 
of capital goods, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and consumer com-
modities, largely from Germany, the USA, the UK, and Japan. Zambia’s imports 
consist mainly of crude oil, chemicals, machinery, iron, steel, textiles, and vehi-
cles, largely from South Africa, the UK, Zimbabwe, and Japan.
Table 5 shows the total numbers and percentages of the workforce that are 
employed in agriculture, industries, and services in South African and Zambia. 
Zambia’s workforce is concentrated in the agricultural sector (65.7 percent) as 
might be expected in a peripheral country, and South Africa’s workforce is con-
centrated in industries (40.9 percent) and services (54.5 percent), which is to be 
expected in a more developed, semi-peripheral economy. 
Aid and ﬁ nancial ﬂ ows are another set of useful indicators of South Africa 
and Zambia’s diﬀ erent positions in the MWS. Table 6 shows that net private 
capital ﬂ ows are comparable in the two countries and that Zambia’s FDI as a per-
centage of GNP was slightly higher than that of South Africa in 1997 (due to the 
impact of privatization eﬀ orts in Zambia at the time). However, Zambia’s much 
higher external debt (at 136 percent of GNP, seven times higher than South 
Africa’s) and serious dependence on oﬃ  cial development assistance (16.7 percent 
of GNP, compared to 0.4 percent in South Africa) constitute clear evidence of 
Zambia’s vulnerable position in the MWS (World Bank 1999:271). Such vulner-
ability makes Zambia more sensitive to external pressures than South Africa as 
the discussion on democratization will show. Th e information provided in tables 
2–6 is consistent with the designation of South Africa as a semi-peripheral state 
and Zambia as a peripheral one.
Lastly, the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United 
Nations Development Programme (2001) provides an indication of the human 
resources available for a particular country (in its quest for development, democ-
ratization, etc.). Ranking on the HDI is predicted to be aﬀ ected by a country’s 
position in the MWS. MWS theory predicts that semi-peripheral states will 
Table 4 – Major Imports According to Product Group, 1995
Zambia
Value as % of GDP**
Petroleum & Crude Oil
Passenger Cars




Value as % of GDP**
Petroleum & Crude Oil

























* South African Customs Union
** 1990 US$ constant prices
South Africa*
Sources: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (1996:173) and International Trade Centre (2000b)

























Source: African Statistical Yearbook (1998)
Table 6 – Aid and Financial Flows, 1997
South Africa Zambia

























(Million US$ except where noted)
* GNP US$ 1997, http://www.undp.org/hdro/Backmatter2.pdf
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1999/2000 (1999:271)
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have a higher degree of human development than peripheral ones. As Table 7 
shows, South Africa ranks better than Zambia on all components of the HDI.13
As the sections below will illustrate, position in the MWS has been of crucial 
importance for determining domestic characteristics and democratic trajecto-
ries in both South Africa and Zambia. Without taking position in the MWS 
into consideration, and its effect on domestic economies, societies and politics, 
it becomes impossible to understand the constraints under which domestic 
actors operate.
D. Transitions to Democracy
1. South Africa
Early industrialization and the development of Africa’s only “modern” cap-
italist and middle classes, initially driven by core interests, have profoundly 
impacted South Africa’s class structure and civil society (Stadler 1987). Arguably 
the active role of black unions, legalized in 1979 along with other social organiza-
tions (Bendix 1996:233), played a great part in fostering a strong civil society and 
democratic practices among the majority of South Africans oﬃ  cially excluded 
from such associations and practices in general since the arrival of European 
settlers in 1652 and in particular since the introduction of apartheid in 1948. 
Th e United Democratic Front (UDF), created in 1983 as a multiracial umbrella 
organization bringing together labor unions, churches, student and civic orga-
nizations in the ﬁ ght against apartheid, also contributed to the development of 
civil society among South Africans in the authoritarian apartheid state (Deegan 
1999:67). Th e development of “modern” class relations is due to South Africa’s 
status as a semi-peripheral state containing modern economic sectors conducive 
to the development of class-based organization, including the development of a 
signiﬁ cant middle class, that often proves elusive in peripheral countries.
Commentators on the South African transition to democracy such as 
Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley (1993) and Patti Waldmeir (1997) highlight 
the importance of agency manifested in the willingness of key actors within both 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the NP to negotiate a transition to 
democracy. However, structural aspects of the “inevitability” of the transition are 
also evident in their accounts. Th ey emphasize the political stalemate and unten-
able economic situation developed by the end of the 1980s, the rapprochement 
between the NP and ANC (beginning with secret talks in the 1980s and esca-
lating with the ascendance of F. W. de Klerk to the South African presidency), 
and the elite pact between the NP and ANC leaderships making the ﬁ nal tran-
sition to democracy (the 1994 national elections) possible. In this sense, while 
individual actors were able to shape the outcome of the transition to a signiﬁ cant 
degree, forces “larger” than individuals moved the process itself forward. A tran-
sition of some sort was bound to take place by the early 1990s. 
Hein Marais (1998) provides a somewhat pessimistic assessment of the 
transition to democracy. He argues that a (race-based) capitalist logic of accu-
mulation created “two nations”—one privileged and one destitute—since the 





































































































































































































































































Source: United Nations Development Programme (2001:142–143)
13.  “[T]he HDI reﬂ ects achievements in the most basic human capabilities-leading a long life, 
being knowledgeable and enjoying a decent standard of living. Th ree variables have been chosen to 
represent these dimensions-life expectancy, educational attainment and income” (UNDP 1999).
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discovery of minerals in the nineteenth century.14 When faced with an “organic 
crisis” the same capitalist system facilitated a pacted transition which managed 
to co-opt ANC elites and thus keep capital interests privileged at the expense 
of real socioeconomic transformation by creating a new centrist pro-capital 
bloc. Th is reading of the transition sees the appeasement of capital as perhaps 
unavoidable and South Africa destined to continue on the “two nations” track (cf. 
Bond 2000).15 At the same time, South Africa’s transition to democracy has not 
been at the mercy of IFI’s as the transition in Zambia clearly has been.
Despite some doubts about fairness and openness (mainly in KwaZulu-
Natal), the 1994 South African elections were by and large considered a success 
and an oﬃ  cial manifestation of the establishment of true democracy in South 
Africa (Reynolds 1994; Johnson and Schlemmer 1996; Butler 1998). Th e ANC 
ran on a nonracial platform and captured 62.6 percent of the votes and 255 of 400 
seats in the National Assembly (Reynolds 1994).
2. Zambia
Zambia lacks the same history of an indigenous capitalist class and com-
petent bureaucracy as developed in South Africa. “[T]he Zambian bureaucracy 
has a far shorter history of professionalization [and] Zambia was essentially 
a labor-reserve colony” until the 1960s when advanced training for Zambians 
began (Denemark 1991:534). Despite the relatively strong performance of the 
Zambian economy during the decade following independence, neglecting to 
invest in proper training of the Zambian bureaucracy has resulted in a poorly 
administered, and therefore weak, state. However, the emphasis on copper 
mining in the primary sector created a class-conscious proletariat and a sense of 
civil society reinforced by trade union practices (Hamalengwa 1992). Arguably 
the inﬂ uence of civil society through the unions, considering that Kenneth 
Kaunda’s successor Frederick Chiluba was Zambia’s foremost union leader, 
played an important part in the events leading up to the 1991 democratic elec-
tions (Ihonvbere 1996:Ch. 3).
Th e weakness of Zambia’s economy, coupled with the weak state typical of 
peripheral regions and exacerbated by internal pressures for change (Denemark 
1991), led to its acceptance of IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP’s) 
and eventually the end of President Kaunda’s one-party state (Bratton 1994, 
107–108). Th is development is important, because countries most likely to be 
forced into accepting SAP’s wholesale are the countries most likely to see their 
democratic legitimacy subsequently undermined (Mkandawire 1999, 125–130). 
During a crisis of political realignment Chiluba’s Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) emerged as a viable opposition to Kaunda and the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP). Th e government’s ﬁ nal loss of legitimacy 
was illustrated by the urban food riots of 1990 that eventually turned political 
(Bratton 1994:102).
Zambia became a formal democracy after Kaunda signed a constitutional 
amendment introducing the Th ird Republic in 1990 and subsequently stepped 
down as president after his electoral defeat by Chiluba and the MMD in October 
1991. In this election, the MMD captured over 75 percent of the vote and 125 out 
of 150 seats in the National Assembly (Burnell 1996:407). Th e 1991 election was 
widely regarded as free and fair by international observers (Bjornlund et. al. 1992; 
Bratton 1992; Commonwealth Observer Group 1992). 
Th e peaceful nature of the democratic transition was applauded both domes-
tically and internationally. Zambia was upheld as a model of transition and ben-
eﬁ ted from a large inﬂ ow of foreign aid. Th e inﬂ ow of aid was not only a result 
of the successful electoral transition, but also because Zambia’s new regime had 
committed to economic liberalization and structural adjustment (Baylies and 
Szeftel 1997:113). At the time of the initial transition to democracy, however, the 
World Bank (1994:58) rated Zambia’s overall macroeconomic policy stance as 
“very poor” (in comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries) and noted 
that Zambia’s changes in macroeconomic policies from 1981–1986 and 1987–1991 
had “deteriorated.” Ultimately, post-transition Zambia has been bogged down in 
economic stagnation and dependency and hopes for democratic consolidation 
seem dim.
Th e events leading up to the democratic transition in Zambia in 1991 are an 
excellent example of how systemic forces both shape and interact with the inter-
nal weaknesses characteristic of peripheral states to inﬂ uence domestic events 
and, in this case, translate into poor prospects for democratic consolidation. 
Th us Zambia’s democratic experience cannot be fully comprehended without 
situating it within the context of the MWS as a whole.
14. South African President Th abo Mbeki has often spoken of South Africa as racially divided 
into “two nations.” Addressing COSATU’s 7th National Congress in September 2000, Mbeki 
stated that “[t]hese masses want to see an end to racism. Th ey want to see an end to the situation 
in which our country is divided into two nations, one well-oﬀ  and white and the other poor and 
black” (COSATU 2000).
15.  Marais’ (1998) account diﬀ ers from those of Adam and Moodley (1993) and Waldmeir 
(1997) in that it emphasizes ANC concessions where the others emphasize NP negotiation defeat. 
However, Marais follows Adam Przeworski (1991) who argues that a pacted transition is necessar-
ily a conservative one and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1995) who convincingly argue 
that pacted transitions result in the old order being able to signiﬁ cantly inﬂ uence future arrange-
ments.
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E. Consolidation of Democracy: Success and Failure
A measure which can be used as an indicator of how a country’s consoli-
dation process is progressing is the Freedom House (2000) survey of political 
rights and civil liberties, which designates countries as being “free,” “partly free” or 
“not free.” While it is important to note that Freedom House measures freedom 
in strictly “negative” terms, i.e., the absence of government restrictions on politi-
cal rights and civil liberties (any “positive” notions of freedom relating to equi-
table economic distribution etc. are not considered), Table 8 clearly indicates 
that in terms of the freedoms measured by Freedom House, South Africa has 
managed to maintain a society respectful of political rights and civil liberties 
since 1994. In Zambia the emergence of a free society in 1991 has reverted back 
to a partly free society with significant infringements upon political rights and 
civil liberties that worsened at the time of the second multiparty elections in 
1996. While a low (i.e., “more free”) Freedom House score is not synonymous 
with degree of consolidation achieved, it stands to reason that a country in 
which political rights and civil liberties are severely infringed upon is likely to 
also be experiencing some of the democratic erosion, and possibly breakdown, 
that Schedler (1998–103) warns of.
Margaret Hanson and James Hentz (1999) argue that the South African 
government has been able to respond to core pressures for economic restructur-
ing and appropriate these ideas as their own, thus making it restructuring on 
South African terms rather than “neocolonial” imposition, to a degree not pos-
sible in Zambia. Th e empirical evidence on democratic transition and consolida-
tion presented here seems to corroborate Hanson and Hentz’s (1999) claim and 
suggests that at least some degree of agreement between international actors, 
government, and perhaps also society on the necessity of liberalization and 
restructuring has emerged in South Africa but not in Zambia. Th us consolida-
tion in South Africa is less prone to becoming complicated by serious vacillation 
on the reforms needed for long-term growth as demanded by the world-econ-
omy and its key actors whereas in Zambia lingering disagreements on how to 
liberalize and restructure are bound to further complicate the wavering consoli-
dation process.16
Comparing South Africa and Zambia’s past transactions with the IMF gives 
us a clear indicator of Zambia’s greater economic vulnerability and dependence 
on IFI’s, as well as the greater leverage by IFI’s over Zambia’s democratization 
process. In 1983 South Africa entered its only stand-by arrangement with the 
IMF, drawing 159 out of 364 SDR million approved.17 In addition, South Africa 
drew 614.43 SDR million from the IMF General Resources Account (GRA) 
in 1993 and repaid this amount in 1997–98.18 South Africa currently has no 
outstanding purchases or loans, nor any projected obligations, to the IMF 
(International Monetary Fund 2001a). By contrast, Zambia has borrowed regu-
larly from the IMF since 1984. Zambia drew 147.5 and 103.8 SDR million from 
the GRA in 1984 and 1986 respectively, an additional 1485.113 SDR million from 
the GRA and the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1995, and a total 
of 64.94 SDR million from the SAF between 1997 and 2001. Zambia is sched-
uled to repay approximately 172 SDR million per year (principal and interest) 
Table 8 – Freedom House, Annual Survey of Freedom Scores, 1990–1991
through 1999–2000











Source: Freedom House (2001)
The characters representing scores for each year are, from left to right, political rights, civil liberties, 
and freedom status. Each of the first two is measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing 
the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.  “F,” “PF,” and “NF” respectively stand for “free”, 
“partly free,” and “not free.” Countries whose combined averages for political rights and for civil 
liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designated “free;” between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free;” and between 
5.5 and 7.0 “not free.” For a fuller explanation of the methodology consult the most recent edition of 
the survey, available online: 
<http://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/methodology.htm>. 
16.  Patrick Bond (2000) does emphasize that South Africa’s transition to democracy also has 
been hampered by constraints imposed by the core actors of the world economy and that the 
domestic discourse on appropriate policy has been conﬂ ictual. However, the conﬂ ict over policy in 
South Africa has not been characterized by nearly the same degree of vacillation and volatility as 
compared with that in Zambia.
17.  Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is an artiﬁ cial currency unit created by the IMF in 1996. 
It is used as an international reserve asset and is deﬁ ned as a basket of national currencies-Euro, 
Japanese Yen, Pound sterling, and U.S. dollar (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
sdr.htm).
18.  Th e GRA contains the IMF’s ﬁ nancial resources that are based on member nations’ sub-
scriptions (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/activity/2001/070601.htm).
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to the IMF through 2005. Th e country’s outstanding purchases and loans, 181.74 
million in SAF arrangements and 716.62 SDR million in Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (ESAF) arrangements, constitute 37.2 percent and 146.5 
percent of its quota respectively (International Monetary Fund 2001b). 
Th is comparison of each country’s involvement with the IMF provides an 
appreciation of Zambia’s diﬃ  culties in terms of acting independently vis-à-vis 
core interests and why the country’s peripheral role in the world-economy has 
resulted in a more volatile transition to democracy than has been the case in 
South Africa. Th e dependence on core-led IFI’s is more acutely felt in Zambia 
and thus disagreements over what economic policies are appropriate, and how 
IFI demands infringe on national sovereignty, are more likely to result in con-
ﬂ ict that impedes democratization. Whereas there at times have been sharp 
disagreements between the ANC and its alliance partners, the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP), on major economic policy decisions such as the move from 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) to the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR), the ANC has had an easier 
time acquiring “ownership” of its economic policies and its developmental proj-
ects than has Zambia’s MMD (Hanson and Hentz 1999). 
Ironically, the IMF’s insistence on neoliberal policy adjustments for develop-
ing countries today follows a long period of IMF support for “statist” policies. 
According to George Ayittey (1998:270), IMF emphasis on conditionality and 
macro management reinforced notions of state control and management in 
Africa. 
For 30 years, Zambia’s statist policies of import-substitution, subsidized 
food prices and state enterprises were backed by western economic advisers 
including the World Bank. True, the IMF always disliked them, but then, 
as one IMF official said privately: “Why did we lend $1.2 billion to a govern-
ment whose policies we disapproved of?” (The Economist 1995:34). 
1. South Africa
Despite setbacks and international doubts, South African consolidation has 
made steady, if slow, progress (Southall 2000). Th e second national elections in 
June 1999, as well as local government elections in 1995 and 2000, have further 
established South Africa as a democracy able to survive internal and external 
pressures. Th e 1999 national elections saw the ANC win yet another decisive vic-
tory capturing 66.3 percent of the votes and 266 of 400 seats in the National 
Assembly (Friedman 1999).
Although the 1999 elections saw some realignment in the South African 
political arena, voting patterns still resemble societal ethnic cleavages (that also 
correlate with socioeconomic cleavages) where whites still support “white par-
ties” and blacks still support “black parties.” Th e most signiﬁ cant results of the 
1999 elections were the decline in support for the New National Party (NNP) 
by two-thirds (from about 21 to 7 percent) and the rapid rise of the Democratic 
Party (DP) from less than 2 to almost 10 percent, thus making it the new oﬃ  -
cial opposition. Th e fact that the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) remained in 
control of KwaZulu-Natal despite an oﬀ er by the ANC to name IFP leader 
Mangosuthu Buthelezi Deputy President in return for an ANC premiership in 
the province, and that the Western Cape remained in NNP hands (through a 
coalition with the DP) despite an ANC plurality (about 42 percent) in the prov-
ince are also signiﬁ cant as they provide indications of signiﬁ cant opposition to 
the dominant ANC as well as the latter’s ability to accept rejection and electoral 
defeat. 
Th e 2000 local government elections have arguably transformed the South 
African political landscape into a “two-party” system with the ANC receiving 59.4 
percent of votes nationwide, the Democratic Alliance (DA)—which includes the 
NNP, the DP, and the Federal Alliance (FA)—22.1 percent, the IFP 9.1 percent 
(concentrated in KwaZulu-Natal) and various other parties between 2.6 and 0.3 
percent each (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 2000). Th e rejection in suc-
cessive elections of extreme parties on the right and left, e.g., the Freedom Front 
(FF) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), points to a preference for centrist 
politics and a degree of continuity among the South African electorate. Th is is a 
good omen for the future of democratic consolidation, and in terms of success-
ful multiparty elections being one sign of consolidation South Africa’s positive 
experience has been quite diﬀ erent from the reversal of consolidation occurring 
in Zambia between its 1991 and 1996 elections.
On the other hand, successful elections are not a suﬃ  cient cause for dem-
ocratic consolidation, and in South Africa consolidation has been hampered 
by diﬀ erences between liberal and emancipatory understandings of democracy. 
Liberal democracy is often associated with minimalist requirements of democ-
racy (Di Palma 1990; Huntington 1991). Emancipatory democracy entails a 
notion of transformation (Gould 1988; Pateman 1970) along with socioeconomic 
justice and fairness, deliberation of issues at the grassroots level, and partici-
pation in decision-making (Koelble 1998:34). Persistent signs that the South 
African citizenry does not agree on the meaning of democracy, or how it ought 
best to be practiced, signals potential trouble ahead for consolidation (Koelble 
1998, 100; Mattes and Th iel 1998). Th e stark diﬀ erences in understandings of 
what democracy means stem in part from the existence in semi-peripheral South 
Stefan Andreasson 206 Divergent Paths of Development 207
Africa of both a small but signiﬁ cant “core” upper-middle class and a larger 
“peripheral” lumpenproletariat.
A 1996 IDASA survey found that 41 percent of respondents in the Western 
Cape, 37 percent in KwaZulu-Natal, and 29 percent nationally associated democ-
racy with substantial improvements in their lives, thus conceiving of democracy 
as emancipatory. Forty-ﬁ ve percent of respondents nationally, 33 percent in the 
Western Cape and 39 percent in KwaZulu-Natal regarded democracy as consist-
ing essentially of a speciﬁ ed set of procedures, thus conceiving of democracy in 
procedural (Western liberal) terms. Other respondents were ambivalent about 
the meaning of democracy in substantial (emancipatory) or procedural (liberal) 
terms (IDASA Public Opinion Service 1996a:4–6 and 1996b:6–9).
South Africa’s government generally respects the human rights of its citizens 
even though killings due to excessive use of force by security forces and deaths 
in police custody remains a problem in some areas. Levels of political violence 
have been reduced since 1998 but remain a problem in KwaZulu-Natal (U.S. 
State Department 2000a). Amnesty International (2000a) is more critical and 
reports that torture and unnecessary violence is still common among the South 
African police, that asylum-seekers and suspected illegal immigrants face oﬃ  cial 
ill-treatment and racially motivated attacks, and that political violence still takes 
place in parts of the country.
On the economic front, South Africa has emerged out of the era of apartheid-
isolation as a thoroughly re-integrated player in the global economy (Koelble 
1998), which has led to tensions between the ANC and its government allies, 
the SACP and COSATU. Th ese tensions are illustrative of the eﬀ ect of MWS 
forces on domestic relationships between state, capital and civil society in a semi-
peripheral country pressured by sharply divergent concerns of “core” and “periph-
ery” segments of society. Th e emerging rift within the Tripartite Alliance is due 
to the ANC’s acceptance of neoliberal economic growth policies as the only 
method capable of providing the resources needed to correct the inequalities cre-
ated by centuries of race-based oppression while its allies pushes for highly redis-
tributive policies (Ward 1998:50). Given the highly skewed income distribution 
in South Africa and the resulting low rate of domestic savings and investment, 
the country needed FDI. Hence pursuit of an “investor-friendly environment” 
and the adoption of the GEAR program in 1996.
South Africa has been better able to enhance the extractive capabilities of 
the state than have weaker (peripheral) countries. Instead of seeing its tax base 
shrink after liberation as has been common in other African countries, the South 
African government under President Nelson Mandela “has broadened the base 
by building an eﬃ  cient collection agency outside the regular civil service” (Africa 
Conﬁ dential 1999c). Th e South African Revenue Service (SARS) collected a 
record R200 billion for the 1999/2000 ﬁ scal year. Revenue collection eﬃ  ciency 
has been steadily improved over the last few years due to improvements in col-
lection procedures and the combating of corruption and fraud (Th e Star 2001). 
Activists in civic organizations suggest that having a substantial tax base outside 
workers employed by government, which is uncommon in most African coun-
tries, is positive for democracy. “It helps democracy. If the government’s taxing 
your income at source, there’s more incentive to hold it to account for the way it’s 
spending your money” (Africa Conﬁ dential 1999c). South Africa’s semi-periph-
eral position in the MWS makes the country more likely to sustain such posi-
tive developments in terms of state capacity whereas peripheral countries (like 
Zambia) will likely see the continuation of poor extractive and distributive capa-
bilities, thus further exacerbating state and civil society weakness, antagonistic 
class relations, and authoritarian tendencies.
South Africa’s semi-peripheral role in the world economy can help with exter-
nal aﬀ airs as well. Th e relationship between Washington D.C. and Pretoria has 
evolved into the closest relationship the U.S. has with any African country. Th e 
institutionalization of this relationship began with the Bi-National Commission 
launched by presidents Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela in 1996 (Africa 
Conﬁ dential 1999a). Pretoria is also asserting its position in the semi-periphery 
by embracing “strategic partners,” such as Argentina, Brazil, Britain, China, and 
Germany.
On the other hand, negotiations over trade relations between South Africa 
and the EU, assumed to become South Africa’s core “benefactor” in terms of pro-
moting a trade relationship conducive to South African development and demo-
cratic consolidation, have become increasingly conﬂ ictual since they begun in 
1994. Th e EU wishes to export cheap manufactures to South Africa while at the 
same time protecting the EU market from competitive South African agricul-
tural goods (Africa Conﬁ dential 1997a). Th e situation is illustrative of the pres-
sures put on developing countries like South Africa today when world markets 
and their core-led representatives (e.g., the EU, U.S., IMF, and World Bank) 
insist on economic liberalization and openness. Th e inability to enjoy relatively 
higher levels of protection of home industries, as countries who in the past 
moved up rapidly in the global division of labor did (e.g., Japan and South 
Korea), gives semi-peripheral countries like South Africa an additional hurdle 
to overcome in their quest for economic development and democratic consolida-
tion.
A democratizing country with a strong and diversiﬁ ed economy is more 
likely to balance the oftentimes conﬂ icting demands of international and domes-
tic capital and societal pressures for redistribution that might threaten the 
consolidation process, but South Africa’s economic progress since the 1994 dem-
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ocratic transition has been anything but promising.19 Serious concerns about 
South Africa’s economic viability, despite the U.S. identiﬁ cation of South Africa 
as one of ten “Big Emerging Markets” (BEM’s) and the general goodwill dis-
played internationally towards South Africa’s ﬁ rst true democratic government 
remain (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998a, 29–30). 
While South Africa faces pressures related to globalization, the country does 
have an inherent advantage over peripheral states in that it can diﬀ use some of 
its internal costs to other states dependent on the South African economy in 
the region. McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998a and 1998b:167) argue that 
South African capital has been increasingly hegemonic in the southern African 
region since 1994 and that the present South African government strongly sup-
ports capital’s economic aspirations.
South Africa’s trade with the European Union (a key part of the core) 
and sub-Saharan Africa (part of the world’s periphery) fits [the] world-
system model of a semi-peripheral state and its paradoxical role in the 
world as both “exploited” and “exploiter” (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 
1998b:169).
Overall, South Africa’s ability to diﬀ use some economic and political costs 
of democratization and economic restructuring onto peripheral neighbors in the 
SADC and beyond, coupled with its administratively capable state organization 
and indigenous capitalist class, indicates that democratic consolidation is a real-
istic goal likely to be attained. Th e role of core capital in South Africa also reﬂ ects 
the country’s position in the MWS. Johannesburg is a “global city,” and Cape 
Town less so, as sites of southern African operations of MNC’s whereas no cities 
in peripheral Zambia play a similar role. Th e empirical evidence tentatively sup-
ports the prediction regarding South Africa possessing the resources necessary 
to consolidate its democracy. Of course, semi-peripheral status entails not only 
advantages vis-à-vis the periphery but also the existence of some of the similar 
problems characterizing the periphery and thus South Africa is by no means safe 
from democratic reversals.20
2. Zambia
On most accounts it seems clear that Zambia’s democracy has fallen prey to 
all the potential dangers mentioned by Schedler (1998:91), such as authoritarian 
regression and a “reverse wave.” Many of the diﬃ  culties of consolidating democ-
racy in Zambia relate to the country’s status as one of the poorest in the world 
(UNDP 2001). In accordance with its peripheral location in the MWS, Zambia 
state has been weak and its vulnerable economic position and dependence on 
core donors and organizations has polarized civil society and worsened class 
relations.
Th e re-election of Chiluba in Zambia’s second multiparty elections in 
November 1996 turned out to be quite problematic (Burnell 1996:407; Joseph 
1999:6). President Chiluba’s MMD triumphed at the polls after introducing a 
constitutional amendment that eﬀ ectively barred former President Kaunda from 
running for president again. Chiluba was endorsed by 73 percent of the elec-
torate and the MMD took control over 131 of the 150 seats in the National 
Assembly, a slight increase from 1991 (Baylies and Szeftel 1997:113). 
Michael Bratton and Daniel Posner (1999:392) note that “[w]hile the MMD 
has scored some important successes in the area of economic reform, its per-
formance on the political front has been regressive.” In terms of what Zambia’s 
second national elections in 1996 meant for democratic consolidation, “[t]he 
answer is clear: they set the process back” (Bratton and Posner 1999:402). Th e 
tendency of the MMD to use its position in government (which entails access to 
strategic resources) to bully and intimidate political opposition resembles that of 
the typical peripheral state, using coercion to maintain its rule, as predicted by 
MWS theory.
Richard Joseph (1999:6) argues that while Chiluba’s MMD could have opted 
for the maintenance of a constitutional democracy, the government has resorted 
to intimidation of journalists and civil society activists; it has arrested political 
opponents and has used mysterious bombings as a pretext for imposing states of 
emergency. Indeed,
[i]n six years, Chiluba has taken Zambia back to the worst period of what 
had been, by prevailing African standards, relatively mild authoritarian gov-
ernance under Kaunda. What is more alarming is the ease with which 
Chiluba has manipulated voter support and development aid to withstand 
demands to follow a more democratic course ( Joseph 1999:6).
19. Growth rates have decreased from roughly 4 percent in 1995 to about 1 percent in 1998 
(Ginsberg 1998:4). While job growth in the government sector (which, due to less generation of 
actual revenue, is less desirable) has decreased from over 4 percent per year in the 1970s to just 
over 2 percent per year in the early 1990s; job growth in the (more desirable) private sector has 
declined from roughly 1.5 percent to less than –2 percent (a total loss of jobs) in the same time 
frame (Ginsberg 1998:86).
20.  Democratic consolidation in South Africa faces several challenges, most notably those 
relating to poverty, crime and health. When asked to list the most pressing problems South 
Africa faces, survey respondents consistently mention job creation/unemployment (75 percent) 
and crime (61 percent) as the top concerns. Housing comes in as a distant third concern (34 per-
cent) (IDASA Opinion ‘99). Th e AIDS crisis is proving particularly devastating for the African 
continent. According to the World Health Organization, approximately 80 percent of all AIDS 
cases worldwide occur in sub-Saharan Africa. Th e southern African region is the hardest hit by 
AIDS today, and 20 percent of South Africa’s adult population is HIV positive with about 2000 
new infections occurring daily (UNAIDS 2000).
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Th e U.S. State Department (2000b) considers the Zambian government’s 
human rights record as generally poor. Th e government has taken some steps 
to address these problems, but political rights were seriously infringed upon 
during the 1996 national elections, police killings and routine beatings and abuse 
of criminal suspects remain a widespread problem, and the independent press 
is harassed by the government through the courts. A state of emergency was 
declared in Zambia in October 1997 and lasted until March 1998 following an 
alleged coup plot on October 29. During this time government was granted 
freedom of action beyond the restrictions of constitutional rule. According to 
Amnesty International (2000b) there is still fallout from the trials of those 
accused of involvement in the 1997 coup attempt with several death sentences 
handed down. Th e drunken coup plot, leading to a purge of the Zambian mili-
tary by President Chiluba, is illustrative of how weak peripheral states often fail 
to maintain domestic stability and in trying to do so relapse into authoritarian 
behavior which further alienates international donors that the state is economi-
cally dependent upon. Th e abuse of detainees in this case simply gave Western 
donors yet another reason to withhold aid (Africa Conﬁ dential 1997b).
Judging from recent developments the consolidation project has been a fail-
ure in Zambia and it remains doubtful whether Zambia can regroup and salvage 
the remains of the democratic transition that took place in 1991. Th e November 
4, 1999 assassination of Major Wezi Kaunda (the son of former President 
Kenneth Kaunda) turned Zambia into a “political powder keg.” Following alle-
gations that Major Kaunda was involved in funneling aid to UNITA rebels in 
Angola and training guerillas in eastern Angola close to the Zambian border, the 
assassination might have been a pre-emptive strike aiming at preventing a mili-
tary overthrow of Zambia’s President Chiluba (Johannesburg Mail & Guardian 
1999). On July 6, 2001 former MMD Deputy National Secretary Paul Tembo 
was assassinated in his Lusaka home by gunmen on the same day he was sched-
uled to testify before a tribunal investigating alleged large scale fraud by three 
MMD ministers in the Chiluba government (Th e Post [Lusaka] 2001b). Th ese 
events indicate that continued political volatility is to be expected in Zambia.
Zambia’s impoverished economy and history of one-party rule means that 
the current government faces enormous challenges in terms of balancing the 
demands for liberalization by the international community with the redistrib-
utive demands of the Zambian citizenry. Th e government is heavily reliant 
upon other nations and non-governmental organizations for aid, loans, conces-
sions, credit, and support (see Table 6). When the MMD promised delivery and 
improvements in living conditions by campaigning under the slogan “Th e Hour 
has come” it beneﬁ ted from the frustration and alienation Zambians felt toward 
the previous regime and its inability to improve the economy, human rights and 
overall living conditions (Ihonvbere 1996:169–172). However, the “revolution of 
rising expectations” might result in increasing protests and instability if promises 
cannot be fulﬁ lled. A volatile societal climate emerges in which the “normality” of 
democratic society fails to materialize, and as expected Zambia has not been as 
resilient as South Africa in terms of safeguarding initial democratic success.
IMF and World Bank demands for economic liberalization have resulted 
in signiﬁ cant privatization of copper mining assets in Zambia. While such 
privatization has boosted Zambia’s competitiveness ranking to twelfth among 
24 ranked African countries according to the Africa Competitiveness Report 
2000/2001 (World Economic Forum 2000), it runs the risk of (re)igniting polit-
ical and economic rivalries (Africa Conﬁ dential 2000b).21 Quarrels between new 
and old copper mining interests that create societal unrest in Zambia’s “copper 
belt” are the unfortunate outcome of policies (allegedly) designed to strengthen 
Zambia’s economy. Instead the result might very well be a further weakening of 
Zambia’s deteriorating democracy. Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) 
Deputy President Japhet Moonde echoes the concerns about negative eﬀ ects of 
core-mandated reforms having a dire impact on Zambian society. 
The economic reform measures under the MMD regime became synony-
mous with retrenchments, redundancies, and joblessness for the majority of 
Zambians where it is estimated that about 70 or 80 percent of Zambians 
live in absolute poverty today, a record that surpasses even the colonial era 
(The Post [Lusaka] 2001a).
Countries like Zambia that have not established ﬁ rm “ownership” of their 
reform programs are heavily dependent on external economic support in order 
for reform initiatives to be continually supported by the government, not 
to mention the populace. Diﬃ  culties associated with demands for structural 
adjustments and economic reforms result in the government blaming IFI’s and 
international and local non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) for “plotting” 
to sabotage the national economy (Africa Conﬁ dential 1999e). Zambia, due to 
its peripheral position in the MWS, is less capable than semi-peripheral South 
21.  Th e Africa Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, designed to predict medium to long term 
growth, ranks South Africa seventh and Zambia twelfth among 24 African countries surveyed. 
Zambia’s relatively high position is due to its recently initiated privatization program. Th e report 
identiﬁ es South Africa as an Africa leader whose performance is very important for an African 
Renaissance. Th e report also addresses the issue of debt forgiveness that is considered key for con-
tinued economic progress on the continent. Jeﬀ rey Sachs contends that the process of granting 
relief to heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) remains inadequate. “Th e process is too slow, 
too stingy, and too arbitrary” as it does not properly take into account real social needs (World 
Economic Forum 2000).
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Africa of acquiring “ownership” and key, if not broad, support for neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms. 
Following the suspension of balance-of-payment support to Zambia by 
European donors after the problematic presidential election in 1996 and con-
tinued poor economic performance, the future of the Zambian government 
was at stake when the World Bank’s consultative group met in Paris on May 
26–28, 1999. Donors seemed somewhat pleased, however, and indicated that fur-
ther support would be forthcoming pending Zambia’s privatization of Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (Africa Conﬁ dential 1999d). Earlier on, the Zambian 
economy was surviving partly due to a US$70 million IMF loan that was granted 
with the understanding that the sales of copper mines would be ﬁ nalized by 
the end of March 1999 (Africa Conﬁ dential 1999b). Th e dependency of Zambia’s 
government on international donors to shore up support for reforms was again 
manifested when only the promise of large sums of money to the Zambian gov-
ernment made at the Consultative Group meeting in Lusaka on July 16–18, 2000 
likely prevented the dismissal of Zambian Finance Minister Katele Kalumba 
and strengthened the position of the relatively few reformers in the government 
(Africa Conﬁ dential 2000b). 
Th e typical “strong-arm” tactics employed by peripheral states like Zambia 
on the political front and in dealing with societal upheaval are partly the result 
of stresses associated with a dependent and vulnerable economic situation. A 
vicious cycle of economic dependence is set in motion, leading to desperate mea-
sures by the state that in turn exacerbate economic dysfunctionality. Th us, fol-
lowing privatization of the Zambian mines in March 2000 (selling major copper 
and cobalt businesses to South African Anglo American Plc and a Canadian-
Swiss consortium), international aid donors have now shifted their focus from 
Zambian macroeconomic policy initiatives to the government’s human rights 
record (Johannesburg Mail & Guardian 2000). 
An examination of the empirical evidence of Zambia’s transition to democ-
racy and subsequent struggle to maintain and consolidate it supports the pre-
diction that Zambia lacks resources necessary for consolidation. While the 
transition in Zambia is more directly linked to its economic vulnerability and 
susceptibility to external pressures than the South African one, it has also 
become clear that Zambia has not been able to diﬀ use the high costs of economic 
adjustment and democratization. Th e economic costs of Zambia’s economic 
restructuring and democratic transition remain within the country, aﬀ ecting a 
citizenry already desperate for improvements in living standards. Th e economy 
remains exposed to volatility, and as the state is unable to improve living stan-
dards conﬂ ict escalates and ultimately the government clamps down on civil 
society and democratic rights. Zambia’s peripheral status in the world-system is 
seemingly a key factor in explaining the country’s struggle to break out of the 
vicious cycle of poverty and undemocratic governance.
V. CONCLUSION
South Africa shares many economic and social problems with peripheral 
countries. How can economic growth be encouraged while the government at the 
same time seeks redistribution as a means of uplifting its impoverished masses? 
South Africa also enjoys some of the advantages associated with semi-peripheral 
states; its economy is more diversiﬁ ed and modern than those of its peripheral 
neighbors and its modern administrative and commercial infrastructure makes it 
better positioned to compete in the global economy and to eﬃ  ciently administer 
domestic economic and social activities. For South African democracy to prevail 
and fully consolidate, its leaders and citizens will have to carefully utilize the eco-
nomic and political advantages that semi-peripheral status entails. Th e irony is 
that South African success will likely come at the partial expense of its peripheral 
neighbors (McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng 1998b). 
Zambia’s misfortunes since the democratic transition in 1991 are illustrative 
of its inferior situation as a peripheral country. Zambia has remained a weak, 
vulnerable, and peripheral state where authoritarian leaders can prey upon the 
citizenry. Widespread poverty and peripheral status in the world-economy does 
not make successful democratization impossible (as Botswana, one of the world’s 
poorest countries at independence, has shown), but in the case of Zambia all 
the weaknesses and disadvantages usually attributed to peripheral status seem to 
have combined to make successful democratization an elusive goal.
Overall we see that an inferior position in the global division of labor leads to 
state weakness and a drain on resources needed for development, and thus it also 
tends to have a disruptive impact on civil society and class relations. Using an 
MWS approach to understand processes of democratization is especially useful 
because it allows us not only to see the obvious linkage between higher socioeco-
nomic development and democratic stability that modernization theory posits, 
but also how development in the non-core is greatly aﬀ ected by decisions made 
in the core and how even some (short term) success with economic growth and 
management can be oﬀ set by the vulnerability and characteristic weaknesses that 
a peripheral position in the MWS entails. 
Th e empirical evidence on the divergent democratization trajectories in 
South Africa and Zambia appears to support Hypothesis 1 somewhat and 
Hypothesis 2 more clearly. Based on the experience of South Africa it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that semi-peripheral states are better equipped to mitigate 
external pressures for economic and political change and thus undertake democ-
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ratization on their “own terms.” Based on the experience of Zambia, peripheral 
states are arguably much less able to democratize on their “own terms” due to a 
lack of economic resources and a weaker state and civil society.
Th e central irony of the MWS is manifested in these two case studies 
of democratic consolidation. Th e weakest states in the MWS can be pushed 
around by core powers and thus more easily forced to democratize (e.g., Zambia 
and many other African states). At the same time, these weak states are the least 
likely to possess the resources necessary to consolidate their democratic transi-
tion. On the other hand, semi-peripheral states can maintain their independence 
vis-à-vis the core to a higher degree (e.g., South Africa’s decades long resistance 
to sustained internal and external pressures for democratization), but if the deci-
sion is made to undertake a democratic transition they are more likely to possess 
the resources necessary for successful consolidation.
Bringing back the research question that prompted this article: can a MWS 
approach help us explain processes of democratization within states? It becomes 
clear that the MWS approach has indeed been valuable, as the processes of 
democratization and consolidation in both South Africa and Zambia have been 
shaped by each country’s position in the MWS. Of course, agency is not irrel-
evant, and Frederick Chiluba has not provided the leadership for Zambia that 
Nelson Mandela or (arguably) Th abo Mbeki have for South Africa. However, 
because location in the MWS matters, conventional (modernization) theories 
of democratization and consolidation that emphasize internal factors need to be 
revised and embrace a more holistic approach to democratization. To this end a 
MWS perspective can serve as a valuable theoretical complement.
Th e MWS approach underscores the importance of taking exogenous, sys-
temic factors into serious consideration when discussing democratization and 
consolidation (cf. Martin 2000:258). Th is understanding ought to impact the 
way in which social scientists approach all societal phenomena that are global in 
nature:
For social scientists, internationalization of the world economy should 
sound the death-knell to the anachronistic divisions, institutionalized in 
universities, between “comparative politics” and “international relations.” 
Cross-national comparisons are meaningless without placing the countries 
being compared in the context of a common world political economy within 
which they operate. Likewise, theories of international relations that treat 
all countries as fundamentally similar provide only limited insight into the 
variations in policy and institutional change. Neither comparative politics 
nor international relations can be coherently understood without aid from 
the other (Keohane and Milner 1996:257).
While it might seem obvious that states with more resources have a higher 
likelihood of consolidating democracy, the MWS approach is especially valuable 
for understanding the causal pathway between position in the MWS and dem-
ocratic consolidation. Furthermore, the MWS approach is particularly useful 
for exposing the primary importance of factors such as external pressures and 
economic vulnerability. In the end, approaching democratic transitions and con-
solidation from a global perspective is necessary for discovering the secrets of 
democratic success and failure.
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